The string you've shared looks like a Local File Inclusion (LFI) Path Traversal
who was building a revolutionary new app. Alex was fast, efficient, and loved using automation. To make things easy, Alex kept a set of "keys"— AWS credentials
In modern cloud-native applications, web servers often run on cloud instances (like Amazon EC2). If developers mistakenly configure AWS CLI profiles directly on the host machine instead of using secure Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles, the sensitive keys are written to a plaintext file:
He’d seen plenty of URL-encoded directory traversal attempts: ..%2F sequences trying to climb out of a web root. But this one was different. The hyphens. The asterisk. The lowercase -file- prefix—almost like a command flag. -file-..-2F..-2F..-2F..-2Fhome-2F-2A-2F.aws-2Fcredentials
Attackers specifically target the .aws/credentials file because it contains plain-text authentication tokens that grant programmatic access to an organization's AWS cloud environment.
Spawning massive fleets of expensive GPU instances to mine cryptocurrency at the victim's expense. How the Vulnerability Occurs
One day, while testing the app's file-upload feature, Alex made a small mistake in the code. This mistake allowed the app to "look" outside its own folder. A curious visitor (or a malicious script) discovered this and used a string exactly like yours— ../../../../home/*/.aws/credentials The string you've shared looks like a Local
With these two pieces of information, an attacker can authenticate as the compromised IAM user or role and perform any action permitted by that identity—from launching expensive EC2 instances to exfiltrating S3 buckets, deleting backups, or pivoting into other cloud resources. According to the AWS Shared Responsibility Model , protecting access keys is entirely the customer’s responsibility. A leaked credentials file is a incident.
The payload string is a URL-encoded variant of a classic file path traversal attack. It targets the default storage location of AWS CLI and SDK configuration secrets on Linux and Unix-like operating systems.
Securing applications against path traversal attacks requires a multi-layered defense strategy focused on input validation, framework features, and cloud architecture best practices. 1. Avoid Direct File System Inputs If developers mistakenly configure AWS CLI profiles directly
Marcus ssh’d into his jump box. Typed: ls -la /home/*/.aws/credentials
Preventing traversal attacks targeting cloud credentials requires a defense-in-depth approach touching both application code and cloud architecture. 1. Implement Strict Input Validation (Allowlisting)
: This is the final destination—the default location where the AWS CLI and SDKs store permanent access keys. Why Target the .aws/credentials File?
:The -2A is an encoded asterisk ( * ). This is used to bypass the need to know a specific username. It essentially tells the system: "Look in every user's home folder."